Working Papers

Talent Hoarding in Organizations   [Revise & Resubmit at the American Economic Review, Updated February 2024]

Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention,  Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC

Coverage: Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Economist, Marginal Revolution, The Visible Hand Podcast

Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large manufacturing firm. Talent hoarding is reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in managerial decisions, and occurs more frequently when hoarding incentives are stronger. Using quasi-random variation in exposure to talent hoarding, I demonstrate that hoarding deters workers from applying to new positions, inhibiting worker career progression and altering the allocation of talent in the firm.

The Broken Rung: Gender and the Leadership Gap [Updated April 2024]

Awards:  UniCredit Foundation Best Paper Award on Gender Economics 2022, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Coverage: My Collective Podcast, Süddeutsche Zeitung

Abstract:  Addressing female underrepresentation in leadership positions has become a key policy objective. However, little is known about the extent to which the leadership ladder appeals differently to women relative to men. Collecting new data from a large multinational firm, I document the existence of a broken rung: women at lower hierarchy levels are 27% less likely to apply for early-career promotions. Both realized application patterns and large-scale surveys at the firm reveal the role of an understudied feature of promotions—having to assume responsibility over a team—which is less appealing to women. This gap is not accounted for by standard explanations, such as family constraints, risk preferences, confidence, or differences in perceived success likelihood. Instead, my findings suggest that organizations can increase female applications by providing more information about what team leadership entails.

Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining) [Revise & Resubmit at the Quarterly Journal of Economics]

Abstract:  We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms’ bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies for 772 German firms, we document that the majority of firms are willing to engage in individual wage bargaining. Labor market factors predict firms’ strategies better than firm characteristics. Survey responses from nearly 10,000 full-time workers indicate that most worker-firm interactions begin with the worker providing their salary expectations. Most interactions end with the worker rejecting the offer and remaining at the incumbent firm. There is substantial heterogeneity in workers’ bargaining behavior, which translates into within-firm wage inequality. Firms that set pay via individual bargaining have a 3 percentage point higher gender wage gap.

Selected Work in Progress
Firm Pay and Worker Search (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining)