Working Papers

Talent Hoarding in Organizations   [Revise & Resubmit (2nd Round) at the American Economic Review, Updated February 2024]

Awards: Young Labour Economist Prize 2021 of the European Association of Labour Economists , W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention,  Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Outstanding Poster Award 2021 ACLEC

Coverage: Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Economist, Marginal Revolution, The Visible Hand Podcast

Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large manufacturing firm. Talent hoarding is reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in managerial decisions, and occurs more frequently when hoarding incentives are stronger. Using quasi-random variation in exposure to talent hoarding, I demonstrate that hoarding deters workers from applying to new positions, inhibiting worker career progression and altering the allocation of talent in the firm.

The Broken Rung: Gender and the Leadership Gap [Updated February 2025]

Awards:  UniCredit Foundation Best Paper Award on Gender Economics 2022, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, Max Weber-Preis 2022 Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Coverage: My Collective Podcast, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Podcast Datenaffäre

Abstract:  Addressing female underrepresentation in leadership positions has become a key policy objective. However, little is known about the extent to which leadership appeals differently to women. Surveys with employees from a large multinational firm document that taking on leadership over a team, which is a salient feature of career advancement in many organizations, is less appealing to women than men. This gender difference is not accounted for by psychological traits or perceptions of treatment as a leader. Instead, my findings suggest that women—even those not facing family constraints—perceive the tasks that team leadership involves as more burdensome. Drawing on the universe of job application and vacancy data at the firm, I show that these gender differences translate into meaningful differences in realized career outcomes, and limit the firm’s ability to fill leadership roles.

Bargaining and Inequality in the Labor Market (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining) [Conditionally Accepted, Quarterly Journal of Economics] NBER Working Paper no. 33396

Abstract:  We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms’ bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies for 772 German firms, we document that the majority of firms are willing to engage in individual wage bargaining. Labor market factors predict firms’ strategies better than firm characteristics. Survey responses from nearly 10,000 full-time workers indicate that most worker-firm interactions begin with the worker providing their salary expectations. Most interactions end with the worker rejecting the offer and remaining at the incumbent firm. There is substantial heterogeneity in workers’ bargaining behavior, which translates into within-firm wage inequality. Firms that set pay via individual bargaining have a 3 percentage point higher gender wage gap.

Firm Pay and Worker Search (with Sydnee Caldwell and Jörg Heining) NBER Working Paper No. 33445

Abstract:  Whether and how workers search on the job depends on their beliefs about pay and working conditions in other firms. Yet little is known about workers’ knowledge of outside pay. We use a large-scale survey of full-time German workers, linked to their Social Security records, to elicit pay expectations and preferences over specific outside firms. Workers believe that they face considerable heterogeneity in their outside pay options, and direct their search toward firms they believe would pay them more. Workers’ expected firm-specific pay premia are highly correlated with pay policies observed in administrative records and with workers’ valuations of firm-specific amenities. Most workers are unwilling to search for a new job—or leave their current firm—even for substantial pay increases. Switching costs are equivalent to 7 to 18% of a worker’s annual pay. Attachment varies across firms, and cannot be explained by either differences in firm-specific amenities or switching costs.